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Abstract  
Subsidiary-level change requires the alignment of subsidiary charters and capabilities. Yet, the 
mechanisms through which the alignment of charters and capabilities unfolds are not yet well 
understood. In this paper, we investigate alignment from the perspective of managerial 
coordination. Drawing on a longitudinal study of a global IT firm, we identify three 
coordination mechanisms (charter-, experience-, and interaction-based coordination). By tracing 
the shifts in these coordination mechanisms over time and by specifying the implications of 
each mechanism for capability level change, we explain how managerial coordination 
influences alignment via subsidiary level capability change as well as alignment via the 
potential renegotiation of charters. This also allows us to provide new insights into situations of 
misalignment by explaining that particular mechanisms of coordination may become a source of 
decoupling between subsidiary actions and HQ mandates and may also result in capability level 
inertia. Moreover, while prior research has already acknowledged the role of interaction-based 
coordination for capability level change we show how and why such a mechanism of 
coordination emerges. 
Keywords: subsidiary change, subsidiary charter, capability development, coordination, micro-
foundations, multinational enterprise 
  




Multinational enterprises (MNEs) benefit from leveraging the location-specific 
advantages of their subsidiaries (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998; Kirca et al., 2011; Rugman 
& Verbeke, 2001). Thus, subsidiary charters are tailored to these local advantages and 
often complement charters of subsidiaries in other countries (Birkinshaw & Hood, 
1998; Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996; Rugman et al., 2011). Such complementary charters 
are common among IT service providers; customer relationships are managed by 
subsidiaries in high-cost countries, but actual services are delivered by subsidiaries in 
low-cost locations (Kumar et al., 2009; Runjuan et al., 2011). In this paper we define 
the term ‘charter’ as the articulated agreement between subsidiaries and headquarters 
(HQ) regarding a subsidiary’s activity scope (Galunich and Eisenhardt, 1996). While 
subsidiary charters allocated by corporate headquarters may function well once 
established, an important question remains: How do firms manage substantial top-down 
changes in subsidiary charters? 
Subsidiary-level changes require the alignment of subsidiary charters and actual 
capabilities. Indeed, the alignment of charters and capabilities is central to subsidiary-
level change and to the overall notion that MNEs can be strategically managed (Galunic 
& Eisenhardt, 1996). In extant research, scholars argue that subsidiary charters and 
capabilities gradually align over time (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Birkinshaw, 2000): 
subsidiaries either allocate resources to developing new capabilities required to fulfill 
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the charter, or managers renegotiate the charter to match existing capabilities (Balogun 
et al., 2011; Birkinshaw & Lingblad, 2005; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). Yet, how the 
alignment of charters and capabilities is actually accomplished through these 
mechanisms is not yet well understood. Also, considering the importance of alignment 
for subsidiary level change it is crucial to understand what challenges managers face 
while attempting to align charters and capabilities.  
This paper contributes towards enhancing research on charter and capability 
alignment by theorizing alignment as a challenge of coordination between subsidiaries 
and HQ. By coordinating, HQ and subsidiary managers establish a shared understanding 
of roles and ensure the accountability and predictability of subsidiary-level resource 
allocations towards building capabilities commensurate with new charters (Okhuysen & 
Bechky, 2009; Srikanth & Puranam, 2010). Specifically, this paper addresses two 
interrelated research questions: What are the mechanisms of coordination through which 
the alignment of subsidiary charters and capabilities unfolds over time? What 
managerial challenges are involved in the process of alignment? 
We draw on an in-depth longitudinal case study of top-down charter change at 
Global Service Solutions (GSS). GSS tried to create synergies among subsidiaries by 
assigning complementary charters. Subsidiaries in high-cost countries were to focus on 
managing client relationships and selling new services, while subsidiaries in low-cost 
locations were to be responsible for service delivery. We show that the alignment of 
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subsidiary charters and capabilities is underpinned by how managers coordinate. Yet, 
we also reveal that alignment following a top-down mandate is potentially undermined 
by shifts in coordination mechanisms (from charter-based coordination to experience-
based and interaction-based coordination). In GSS, these shifts prevented the allocation 
of resources towards developing new capabilities and undermined the firm’s attempt to 
benefit from co-specialized charters.  
Our findings have a number of theoretical implications. By focusing on managerial 
coordination, we unpack not only how coordination mechanisms influence charter and 
capability alignment, or the failure thereof (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Birkinshaw et 
al., 2005; Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2006, 2010), but also why subsidiary 
managers may not try to renegotiate charters despite incongruities with capabilities 
(Balogun et al., 2011; Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2006). This also allows us to provide 
new insights into situations of misalignment by explaining that particular mechanisms 
of coordination may become a source of decoupling between subsidiary actions and HQ 
mandates (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Sandholtz, 2012) as well as inertia with regard to 
subsidiary level capability development (Felin et al., 2012; Vergne & Durand, 2010). 
Finally, while prior research has already acknowledged the role of interaction-based 
coordination for capability level change, specifically in situations of uncertainty, we 
show how and why such a mechanism of coordination emerges (Foss, 2011).  
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Subsidiary charter change and capability development 
Alignment of charters and capabilities: state of research 
Subsidiary-level changes require the convergence of subsidiaries’ capabilities with their 
roles as specified in charters (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Foss et al., 2010; Galunic & 
Eisenhardt, 1996; Hamel & Prahalad, 1983; van Egeraat & Breathnach, 2012). The 
notion of charters has been used in two different ways: On the one hand, charters are 
socially constructed, non-codified agreements regarding a subsidiary’s product/market 
focus within the MNE that are negotiated and renegotiated over time (e.g. Galunic & 
Eisenhardt, 1996; Geppert et al., 2003). On the other, charters might describe an 
‘articulated’ product/market focus (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996, p. 256) that is rather 
formally captured in target agreements, role descriptions and organizational blueprints 
which outline the role a subsidiary is supposed to play. In this paper we draw on the 
latter perspective. In the following, we describe the relationship between subsidiary 
charters and capabilities in greater detail. 
Changes in charters might be triggered by external opportunities or threats, 
entrepreneurial activity at the subsidiary level or top-down mandate (Birkinshaw, 
1996b; Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996). Prior research takes a 
process view, by acknowledging that the alignment of charters and capabilities is 
accomplished over time. Indeed, after a change in charter, capabilities might initially be 
misaligned (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). Capability-level change is not straightforward 
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and takes time due to capabilities’ path-dependent nature (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003) and 
has wider organizational consequences. For instance some employees may need to be 
reallocated to new tasks, while others may be rendered redundant (Birkinshaw & Hood, 
1998; Rindova & Kotha, 2001). Such shifts are likely to lead to political tensions and 
organizational frictions (Balogun et al., 2011) to the point where change may stall, and 
charters might not actually be translated into subsidiary capabilities (Evans & Doz, 
1989). Still, research on subsidiary-level change maintains that, over time, charters and 
capabilities align (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). Below we describe the mechanisms of 
alignment found in prior research. 
Alignment through capability-level changes is based on the idea that eventually, 
capabilities will reflect the new charter. While charters often are based on implicit (and 
even contested) agreements between HQ and subsidiaries, they might also be manifest 
as codified and formalized descriptions of subsidiary roles (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 
1996). In an empirical study of ten divisions of a US based MNE, Galunic and 
Eisenhardt (1996) show that charters are instrumental to ‘align[ing] evolving business 
areas with pockets of corporate resources’ (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996, p. 256). In 
other words, charters become a means to guide subsidiary level resource allocation 
towards developing capabilities commensurate with their particular role inside the 
organization (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998).  
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While alignment might be accomplished through capability level changes, a second 
mechanism of alignment involves the renegotiation of charters. Managers may thereby 
use their influence (Geppert & Williams, 2006; Geppert et al., 2003) or seek to gain 
HQ’s attention and consideration (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008) in order to shape 
subsidiary roles. In a qualitative cross-sectional study of eleven German HQs and their 
Hungarian subsidiaries, Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard (2006) reveal how such 
renegotiations might be due to tensions between HQ’s strategic intent, on the one hand 
side and subsidiary level capabilities and resource advantages, on the other. Similarly, 
in a longitudinal study of subsidiary level change, Balogun (et al., 2011) show how a 
new top down strategic intent became a threat to subsidiary level autonomy which then 
triggered negotiations about charters. The new charter is then used to allocate resources 
toward the maintenance and enhancement of existing capabilities as described above. In 
this paper, we focus on providing a more nuanced understanding of these mechanisms 
underpinning the alignment of subsidiary charters and capabilities. 
A coordination perspective on charter-capability alignment 
Research on subsidiary charter changes suggests that subsidiary charters play an 
important role in the coordination of resource allocation decisions that underpin how 
subsidiary-level capabilities evolve. We define coordination as ‘sequences of actions 
toward a goal with an emphasis on contingencies and interactions among actors’ (Faraj 
& Xiao, 2006, p. 1157). Indeed, the coordinated integration of dispersed activities has 
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been an important research theme in the context of MNEs more generally (Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967; Srikanth & Puranam, 2014; Thompson, 1967). We highlight three 
important themes that are relevant to the role of coordination and the alignment of 
subsidiary charters and capabilities: the relationship between coordinating mechanisms 
and task complexity, conditions for coordinated action, and firm-level consequences of 
coordination. 
Coordination mechanisms and task complexity. Coordination mechanisms are the 
practices or tools used to achieve coordination, and are an important factor influencing 
organizational flexibility (Mom et al., 2009). In some instances, coordination may be 
based on formal rules, routines and standard operating procedures (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1997; Galunic & Rodan, 1998; Thompson, 1967). Subsidiary charters can 
be considered an example of such formal coordinating mechanisms if codified in the 
form of target agreements. In other cases, coordination may be more ad hoc, informal 
and based on direct interaction (Foss, 2011; Jarzabkowski et al., 2012; Srikanth & 
Puranam, 2010). Indeed, the role of formal and informal mechanisms of coordination 
has been a prominent theme in research on MNEs (Boussebaa, 2015; Edström & 
Galbraith, 1977; Marcati, 1989; Reger, 1999).  
This line of research has particularly emphasized the coordination mechanisms 
necessary to deal with high levels of task complexity in MNEs. Studies indicate that 
with increasing task complexity, coordination mechanisms tend to shift towards 
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informal, interaction-based ways of coordinating (Foss, 2011; Mascarenhas, 1984; 
Sinkovics et al., 2011; Srikanth & Puranam, 2010). For instance, Srikanth and Puranam 
(2014) showed that with increasing geographic dispersion, intrafirm coordination relies 
more on what they call tacit forms of coordination, such as a shared understanding of 
goals. Formal coordinating mechanisms might be inappropriate in such settings, as they 
tend to restrict the flow of knowledge (Patriotta et al., 2013). 
Conditions for coordinated action. Both informal and formal ways of coordinating 
create so-called conditions for coordinated action: shared understanding, accountability 
and predictability for mutual actions (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). Shared 
understanding turns objectives and related activities and processes into common 
knowledge. For instance, in their paper on the co-evolution of products, services and 
capabilities, Helfat and Raubitschek (2000, p. 964) showed how shared understanding 
‘enables organizations to coordinate activities within...or across vertical chains’. 
Accountability holds managers responsible for actions and helps ensure a subsidiary 
delivers a service as expected (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). Accountability also holds 
managers responsible for implementing agreed changes—for instance, through contracts 
or target agreements. Finally, predictability means expectations are formed about what 
particular actions can be expected from other parties, and when to expect them 
(Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009).  
Forthcoming in Organization Studies 
10 
 
Consequences of coordination. How managers coordinate may have important firm-
level implications. Indeed, the extent to which firms may benefit from geographically-
dispersed units depends on how functions across units are coordinated (Roth & 
Morrison, 1992; Zeschky et al., 2014). While the emergence of coordination 
mechanisms has been interpreted as being generally beneficial for a firm, recent 
research also demonstrates potential negative effects. In the context of subsidiaries with 
global mandates (e.g., global factories), Buckley (2011) argues that changes in 
objectives and erroneous expectations reduce the benefits of such mandates. Similarly, 
Kellogg et al. (2006) shows that emerging coordinating mechanisms potentially 
counteract other forms of coordination and lead to sub-optimal outcomes.  
Managerial coordination and charter-capability alignment. We aim to provide new 
insights into the alignment of subsidiary charters and capabilities. We have drawn on 
two main strands of literature related to subsidiary charters and coordination theory that 
help to further illuminate the mechanisms underpinning the alignment of charters and 
capabilities. Prior research has already implicitly taken an entity-like approach 
(Hussenot & Missonier, 2016) by acknowledging that alignment is a process that is 
accomplished over time (e.g. Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). Yet, a theory of alignment has 
not yet been developed. By taking a coordination perspective we are able to contribute 
towards developing such a theory by examining the role of both formal and informal 
mechanisms of coordination through which shared understanding, accountability and 
Forthcoming in Organization Studies 
11 
 
predictability of subsidiary-level resource allocations are established and potentially 
changed. From this theoretical perspective, we address the following research questions: 
What are the mechanisms of coordination through which the alignment of a subsidiary’s 
charter and capabilities unfolds over time? What are the managerial challenges involved 
in the alignment process? 
Methodology 
Research design and empirical context 
In order to contribute towards building a process theory of the alignment of charters and 
capabilities, we employed an inductive, longitudinal, single case study design (Langley 
et al., 2013) enabling detailed access to the temporal unfolding of charter and capability 
changes. This research design is particularly useful for illuminating process dynamics 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Yin, 2009); moreover, longitudinal qualitative research is 
becoming increasingly important to MNE scholars (Burgelman, 2011; Doz, 2011; 
Rugman & Verbeke, 2001).  
This research is based on a case study of GSS, a provider of IT software support and 
enhancement services headquartered in Germany. GSS has 2,500 employees in 10 
countries and annual revenues of €300m. GSS is part of an IT conglomerate that we call 
ITCORP. ITCORP realized that competitors had decreased costs by offshoring 
standardized IT work and decided to imitate this strategy. GSS was one of the business 
units spearheading this change. In order to improve competitiveness, GSS introduced 
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‘complementary’ subsidiary roles: consulting units (CUs) in high-cost countries 
(Germany, Austria, US, UK&I, Italy, Netherlands, Finland) were assigned the charter of 
providing IT consulting services, while standardized delivery units (SDUs) in low-cost 
countries (India, Russia, Argentina) were assigned the charter of delivering software 
maintenance services. The complementarity of subsidiary roles required complementary 
capabilities in the respective subsidiaries.  
The main SDUs were located in India and Russia. ITCORP already operated delivery 
centers in various locations (e.g., Croatia) as part of other business units. However, 
because GSS’s objective was to centralize the processing of IT services, there was no 
incentive to maintain several medium-sized SDUs. Yet, GSS did not want to have just 
one SDU, either. GSS’s CEO was anxious that such a unit would hold too much power 
and would become inefficient. For GSS, India appeared to be the most relevant location. 
The SDU in Russia was being established, but focused on just a few clients. The SDU 
in Argentina became operational during data collection, but did not have the same 
importance compared to the subsidiary in India. Therefore, we focus specifically on the 
SDUs in India and Russia.  
Data collection 
We collected data from four primary sources: e-mails, records from GSS’s ticket tool 
software, documents and meeting observations. 
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E-mail data. E-mails have been acknowledged as a rich data source for studying 
coordination (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999; Kijkuit & van den Ende, 2007). We collected 
792 e-mails related to the changes in subsidiary roles at GSS sent directly or copied to 
the CEO from January 2008 to November 2008. We scanned each e-mail and extracted 
messages related to the implementation of the new charters based on key themes related 
to major change initiatives: the target operating model, transfer prices, the ticket tool 
software or staff skills. These data captured the coordinating interactions of managers at 
HQ and in subsidiaries following the official launch of the new subsidiary roles.  
Ticket records. At GSS, tickets are the primary mechanism for recording and routing 
tasks across subsidiaries. Tickets include location stamps, and thus show which 
subsidiaries received and completed tasks. We used ticket data as an objective measure 
of subsidiaries’ compliance with new charters. We were granted access to the overview 
data for all 65,000 tickets that were opened and resolved in five countries for 
approximately 50 clients. These data were selected based on the availability of ticket 
data for subsidiaries using the ticket software. Moreover, we focused on obtaining ticket 
data for key SDUs within GSS (India and Russia). 
Documents. We were also granted access to extensive project documents in the form 
of spreadsheets and PowerPoint presentations, meeting minutes and workshop 
summaries (including pictures). Documents included detailed descriptions of GSS’s 
target operating model (TOM), a codified account of subsidiary roles. These documents 
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also enabled us to build a chronological account of events (Runjuan et al., 2011) and 
yielded insights into how HQ tried to formally coordinate subsidiary activities (such as 
target agreements). We also were granted access to documents from strategy meetings, 
including presentation slides, minutes and pictures documenting workshop activities. 
Observations. The second author worked at GSS HQ as an assistant to the CEO 
(2008–2010). In line with Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) notion of persistent observation, 
the second author’s deep immersion in the context proved crucial in the analysis of the 
wide variety of context-bound data sources (Shah & Corley, 2006). His responsibilities 
involved preparing reports for HQ and planning and participating in quarterly 
management meetings. However, he was not in charge of activities forming the basis of 
this study. His position enabled him to observe both day-to-day activities and 
management meetings. We drew on observational data to construct a picture of the 
overall transformation process and to understand the actual implications of the intended 
changes for HQ and GSS subsidiaries. 
Data analysis 
We followed a process approach to reconstruct the sequence of events at GSS (Langley, 
1999; Langley & Tsoukas, 2010). First, we sensitized ourselves to the scope and 
dynamics of the transformation process in order to become familiar with GSS-specific 
terminology. We also noted all events associated with changes to subsidiary 
capabilities. To establish phases, we first plotted operational practices over time using 
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ticket data. Figure 1 reveals critical turning points that enabled us to interrogate 
document and e-mail data from particular periods. The outcome of this stage of data 
analysis was a structured timeline of events that formed the basis for subsequent stages 
of data analysis. 
In the second stage of data analysis, we established three phases that describe the 
initial alignment and eventual misalignment of charters and capabilities at GSS: (Phase 
1: April–December 2007; Phase 2: January–April 2008; Phase 3: May–September 
2008). Rather than tracking ‘stocks’ of capabilities, these phases represent ‘flows’ 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989), i.e., the allocation of resources towards fulfilling new 
charters. Drawing on Leonard-Barton (1992) we tracked capability changes in skills, 
technical systems, management systems, values and beliefs. In several iterations, we 
established that until December 2007, subsidiaries were emphasizing developing 
capabilities commensurate with new charters. From January to April 2008 there was a 
gradual decline in resource allocation, and from May 2008 onwards, subsidiaries 
reinforced existing capabilities (Table 1).  
In the third stage of data analysis, we evaluated coordination activities between HQ 
and subsidiary managers and outcomes related to the alignment of charters and 
capabilities. For Phase 1 we drew on observational, document and e-mail data; for 
Phases 2 and 3 we predominantly drew on e-mail interactions, as the initial target 
agreements proved less influential. In order to analyze coordination, we used Okhuysen 
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and Bechky’s (2009) components of coordinated action as an analytical scaffold. We 
drew on documentation, e-mail data and meeting observations to analyze how shared 
understanding, accountability and predictability were established and changed. In our 
data, we interpreted predictability as the mutual expectations of managers regarding 
subsidiary-level changes.  
In several iterations, we further refined emerging themes regarding the 
establishment of and changes in shared understanding, accountability and predictability. 
Following Miles and Huberman (1984), we identified themes for each of the three 
components. Overall, 46 themes emerged. We aggregated similar themes, resulting in 
eight main theoretical themes underpinning the components for coordination: shared 
understanding (themes: creation, maintenance), accountability (themes: creation, 
erosion, avoidance) and predictability (themes: expectation structure, expectation reset, 
expectation clash). For example, data coded as being related to themes underpinning 
accountability include ‘Subsidiary managers sign agreement to implement transfer price 
regime’ (creation), ‘CU subsidiary managers ask for exception to transfer price’ 
(erosion), and ‘Dependence on existing clients is used as argument to delay introduction 
of Ti2l’ (avoidance). Moreover, this step of analysis also revealed different managerial 
focal points in each of the three phases: organizing, implementing, and legitimizing.  
Finally, we analyzed the interrelationship and outcomes of coordination shifts. In 
particular, we analyzed how coordination was achieved in each phase. Each phase was 
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characterized by a distinct coordination mechanism (charter-, experience- or interaction-
based coordination) that had implications for the establishment of shared understanding, 
accountability and predictability. We also evaluated how these forms of coordination 
affected subsidiary-level capabilities (see Table 2). 
Changes in subsidiary roles at GSS 
An overview of charter changes at GSS 
As part of GSS’s new strategy, subsidiaries had to focus on different parts of the value 
chain: subsidiaries in high-cost countries were to manage relationships with customers, 
and those in the lower-cost locations of India and Russia were to perform the actual IT 
services for those customers. Service orders were recorded in the form of tickets, which 
could either be resolved locally, or routed to offshore locations. Under the new charters, 
we expected to find increased ticket resolution in India and Russia and decreased ticket 
resolution in high-cost countries. However, the aggregate ticket data for subsidiaries in 
Austria, Germany, the US, India and Russia (January 2007 to December 2008) show the 
opposite trend (Figure 1). 
------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
------------------------------------------------ 
Initially, the number of tickets serviced in India and Russia increased, suggesting that 
subsidiaries had adopted their new roles. However, deviating from their charters, high-
cost locations continued to resolve tickets throughout 2007. Around April 2008, we 
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found that the volume of tickets received in Austria, Germany and the US had 
increased, but the number of tickets resolved in India and Russia had stagnated. In high-
cost countries more ticket work was received and also resolved locally. This trend 
became clearer throughout 2008. 
This misalignment between subsidiary charters and actual practices prevailed, 
suggesting that subsidiaries failed to develop the capabilities necessary for their new 
roles. Table 1 traces the change process at GSS in terms of subsidiary capabilities. 
Similar to the ticket data, this analysis shows that capabilities initially started to 
converge with new charters, for example, through target agreements that specified 
particular IT skills and the use of new software systems. Yet, over time, subsidiaries 
continued to allocate resources to existing capabilities. Later, we show how this failure 
to align subsidiary capabilities and charters was rooted in managerial coordination and 
how shared understanding, accountability and predictability were established and 
maintained.  
------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
------------------------------------------------ 
We particularly follow the interactions of Thomas (CEO) with subsidiary managers who 
played an important role in the GSS change effort: Karthik (India), Veera (Finland), 
Rob (UK) and Ben (US). 
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Phase 1: striving to align charters and capabilities 
In Phase 1 the CEO took initial steps to align subsidiary managers and obtain their 
support for GSS’s new cost reduction strategy in which standardized work would be 
shifted to employees in India and Russia, and employees in high-cost countries would 
continue to perform consulting services. We describe the managerial focus as well as 
how coordination between HQ and subsidiary managers unfolded during this phase. 
Managerial focus: organizing. Managers focused on crafting the ‘ideal organization’ 
and made strategic decisions based on how the organization should ideally operate in 
the future. In order to launch the new strategy, Thomas invited subsidiary managers to a 
series of management meetings to discuss and plan the new organization. Thomas was 
hired from one of GSS’s major competitors, Accenture, which followed a similar 
model. In a presentation to all managers, Thomas laid out the changes to the 
organization, but also asked managers to contribute to the future organizational design. 
The new organization included changes to subsidiaries’ charters, in particular, the split 
into CUs and SDUs.  
Charter-based coordination. To support the implementation of the new strategy, 
subsidiary charters were codified in a so-called target operating model (TOM). The 
TOM specified the new subsidiary roles as well as the respective capabilities required. 
These charters marked a significant change, offering units opportunities to increase 
revenues and reduce costs by ‘accessing the [globally] available skill-base’ and by 
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‘exchanging services worldwide’ as they engaged in complementary activities. CUs 
would focus on new customers, and would only locally perform tasks that were too 
complex to be conducted elsewhere, such as consulting work. The actual provision of IT 
maintenance services would be shifted to the offices in India and Russia (SDUs). At the 
end of the meeting, Thomas expected subsidiary managers to sign target agreements 
that specified subsidiary-level investments in building the skills and technologies 
required to fulfill their new roles. 
Creating shared understanding. In this first phase, managers developed a shared 
understanding of the future state of the organization. Karthik, manager of the Indian 
subsidiary, expected that the new charter would bring more business to his unit. He was 
quite clear about GSS’s new strategy and the implications for his unit. As part of the 
meeting he sketched a picture of India’s role in GSS, portraying it as ‘a “space station” 
[that] delivers [work] to locations globally’, supporting GSS’s operations in ‘different 
locations’ by providing ‘stable delivery of standardized services’. All other subsidiary 
managers were asked to create similar pictures in order to create a shared understanding 
of the co-specialization of new subsidiary roles. 
Accountability creation. To ensure the creation of new capabilities at the subsidiary 
level, GSS introduced a system of new ‘global’ targets for all subsidiary managers. In 
India, this implied the hiring and training of new employees who would perform IT 
maintenance services. In other units, new software, Ti2L, had to be introduced to make 
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sending work abroad possible. Further, GSS units had to adapt their service offerings to 
customers. In one-on-one meetings with Thomas, all subsidiary managers were 
expected to sign formal target agreements through which they would be held 
accountable for building capabilities associated with their new roles. 
Expectation structure. Managers began to form expectations that complementary 
capabilities would soon be available in other subsidiaries. As part of regular 
management meetings, subsidiary managers developed and visualized these 
expectations: available skills for standardized service provision in India and Russia, 
fixed transfer prices between units and new standard ticket software (Ti2L) to record 
and send tasks across subsidiaries. Symbolically, all managers sealed their commitment 
by signing a flipchart with a drawing of the GSS global business model. 
Capability-level changes in Phase 1. At the end of Phase 1, managers within GSS’s 
country units reached an agreement to develop and use complementary and co-
specialized capabilities (see Table 1). The framework provided by Thomas delineated 
fixed terms under which work could be exchanged among subsidiaries. The actions 
from this first phase at least partially succeeded in shifting country managers’ mindsets 
from purely local to global interests. 
Phase 2: Emergence of inconsistencies 
GSS was successful at establishing an in-principle shared understanding of subsidiaries’ 
new roles among subsidiary managers. In Phase 2, managers progressed from 
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conceptual organizing to implementing the new subsidiary roles in practice. Yet, when 
Thomas began to grant exemptions to subsidiary charters, inconsistencies between 
GSS’s strategy and subsidiaries’ investments in new capabilities emerged. 
Managerial focus: operating. With the support of HQ, roadmaps were created 
outlining when each customer had to be switched to Ti2L. This is evident in the 
interaction between an employee in India and the customer service representative in 
Finland: ‘You must be aware that our organization has taken a decision to move from 
various ticketing tools to a common platform…Since Finland is using [AntiQ] as a 
ticketing tool, I would request that we can think of switching over to our common 
software [Ti2L]’ (India to Finland, March 2008). This change in software was necessary 
so that Veera (Finland), Rob (UK) and Ben (US) could transfer the prescribed 
percentage of work per customer to India or Russia. As they moved into the 
implementation phase, managers expected that when sending work abroad, it would be 
performed with the same level of quality. 
Expectation reset. However, the work relationships between subsidiaries were not as 
managers expected. At first, some CUs, such as the Germany office, did route more 
work to India. However, Karthik struggled to scale up subsidiary operations with the 
reliability and service quality expected. In an e-mail to the CEO in April 2008, he 
complained: ‘[w]e have on going [sic] issue with our mail server for some time now. 
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This has resulted in delays in service provision and many customers have shown their 
dissatisfaction’.  
SDU managers’ expectations were unmet as well. In anticipation of major increases 
in business volume, Karthik had hired top graduates, attracting them with the prospect 
of providing challenging work. Instead, the little work that was being transferred to his 
office typically came in the form of simple standardized tasksthe result of CU 
managers’ attempts to avoid customer dissatisfaction. As a consequence, employees in 
India started to leave the company, taking advantage of a booming job market: ‘[In] 
recent weeks we have seen heavy attrition amongst all teams. Most of these are critical 
resources of the team’ (India to CEO, April 2008). The lack of trained personnel further 
decreased service quality and made managers in other CUs even more reluctant to 
outsource services to India.  
Experience-based coordination. As a result of failed expectations, managers’ 
decisions about allocating resources to subsidiary-level capabilities were shaped less by 
the new charters, and more by managers’ experiences with cross-subsidiary work. This 
opened a gap between expectations and actual practices. It would have been sensible for 
managers to resolve these discrepancies, for instance, by renegotiating subsidiary roles. 
However, Thomas was not open to such changes, and managers did not voice such 
desires openly. After all, GSS had been formed within ITCORP around a global 
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business model that required subsidiaries to be complementary. Subsidiaries had high-
stakes incentives to be part of GSS.  
Thus, as capabilities failed to align with subsidiaries’ charters, subsidiary managers 
were keen to overlook discrepancies and instead sought ‘temporary’ exemptions. Even 
after Ben and Veera raised doubts about switching customers in the UK and Finland to 
Ti2L, Karthik affirmed to Thomas that soon all customers would be switched to the 
standard software (April 2008). This affirmation stood in contrast to the fact that 10 
months after the initial assessment, the number of ticket software applications in use 
had not changed, and plans to switch customers had been continuously delayed. 
Nevertheless, managers repeated the mantra that all subsidiaries operated with a single 
software tool, all standardized work was performed by SDUs and the transfer prices for 
internal transfer of work were ‘not negotiable’ (HQ, June 2008). Thus, after initial 
tendencies toward convergence, there was widespread divergence between expectations 
from the charter and actual capabilities. 
Accountability erosion. To accommodate customers’ concerns, Thomas frequently 
granted exemptions that started to erode the system of accountability that bound 
subsidiary managers to the development of new subsidiary capabilities. When informed 
about conflicts between local and global interests, he offered exemptions that allowed 
managers to delay or even temporarily suspend capability-level changes. He did so 
particularly when customer relationships were at stake. For instance, while the fixed 
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transfer prices for services from India provided CUs with reliable figures, to Ben these 
prices appeared too high to compete in the US market: ‘We need to have a market 
competitive pricing to win this. It is a very large opportunity. We require 20 offshore 
[employees]. [If we lowered the] average transfer price [to] $25USD per hour this 
would equate to roughly $1M per year for India and immediately utilize 20 people’ 
(USA to CEO, April 2008). 
Ben used the prospect of much-needed business for India to ask Thomas for his help 
in adjusting the transfer prices: ‘I need your approval to honor this rate for us to win this 
bid. Can you please help me here?’ (USA to CEO, April 2008). Thomas knew that the 
success of GSS depended on acquiring new customers, because only new contracts 
could offset the loss in revenue caused by lower prices charged for the work abroad: ‘If 
we can agree between us…we can meet this price. How you are selling to the customer 
is a different story’ (CEO to USA, April 2008). Such examples demonstrate that 
Thomas prioritized external relationships with customers and competitive local market 
positions in accepting deviations in practice from official subsidiary charters. 
Maintenance of shared understanding. Whereas shared understanding existed 
concerning subsidiaries’ new roles, expectations were frequently unmet. Exemptions 
granted by HQ eroded the structure of accountability that was designed to support and 
ensure capability-building. Nevertheless, strong incentives existed for both HQ and 
subsidiaries to maintain managers’ shared understanding of the new roles, even though 
Forthcoming in Organization Studies 
26 
 
it did not reflect actual practices. Indeed, their shared understanding about the future 
global organization connected subsidiary managers. Consequently, despite 
discrepancies between the charter and actual practices, managers sought to preserve 
their shared understanding and were reluctant to voice nonconformity. Similarly, 
Thomas’s success within ITCORP was tied to making GSS’s strategy work. Thus, 
despite managers’ lack of adherence to the global model, Thomas signaled to ITCORP 
management and to outside analysts that cross-subsidiary exchanges in GSS were 
successful. 
Capability-level changes in Phase 2. In Phase 2, new employees were hired in India, 
but as little work shifted to India, it became difficult to retain skilled employees. Also, 
although managers signaled commitment to Ti2L, they did not implement it. Ti2L is 
one example where global targets conflicted with local customer demand. Although 
Thomas frequently granted informal exemptions, they undermined efforts to implement 
capabilities in line with new subsidiary roles (see Table 1).  
Phase 3: misalignment of charters and capabilities 
In Phase 3, managers increasingly shifted their focus from operating to retaining their 
legitimacy as part of GSS. As they faced complex and divergent expectations from 
customers as well as HQ, subsidiary managers increasingly requested ad-hoc solutions. 
To balance the gap between their formal commitment and divergent practices, managers 
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tried to avoid being held accountable for implementing new capabilities. This resulted 
in the misalignment between new subsidiary charters and actual capabilities. 
Managerial focus: legitimizing. Managers increasingly focused their actions in order 
to be seen as legitimate actors within both GSS and ITCORP. For subsidiary managers, 
being part of GSS had significant advantages. It meant they had access to lower-priced 
services in India or Russia without the need to establish and maintain offshore 
relationships themselves. However, this did not suit all needs. For many subsidiaries, 
the concept of a global organization was a constraint. For instance, an ITCORP unit in 
the Netherlands shifted standardized work to Croatia due to ‘bad experiences with 
India’ and because required knowledge was available in the Croatian subsidiary. 
Consequently, the local Dutch GSS unit either had ‘to go ahead with Croatia too or 
transfer knowledge to our Indian unit’ (Netherlands to CEO, June 2008). Thus, the 
availability of offshore capacity outside GSS challenged the standing of the Indian 
subsidiary as a hub for offshore work. Still, the Dutch subsidiary reaffirmed its support 
and confirmed the shared understanding of new subsidiary roles by emphasizing its 
intention to shift work to India. In contrast, Veera, the Finnish subsidiary manager, 
wanted to ensure utilization of local staff before offshoring any work. 
Expectation clash. Subsidiary managers were thus faced with a complex system of 
conflicting expectations that increasingly influenced their actions. Customers expected 
that services were to be completed at the quality level of domestic services, but at a 
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lower cost: ‘German quality at Indian prices’, as one manager put it. Thus, HQ expected 
CUs to send a larger portion of work to SDUs in India and Russia. However, customers 
raised concerns about the quality of the work performed abroad. Also, many clients did 
not want to implement Ti2L. In the US, Ben finally managed to convince one of his 
customers to switch to Ti2L, but his success was short-lived: ‘[The customer] 
requires…functionality which we are being told will take a very long time [to 
implement]. This threatens customer relationships…I sense the client’s overwhelming 
frustration’ (September 2008). 
Interaction-based coordination. In this phase, the role of codified subsidiary charters 
as a coordinating mechanism was further diminished. Knowing that some business 
decisions would violate the expectations of other subsidiaries, subsidiary managers 
increasingly shifted to a case-by-case approach to coordination in order to maintain HQ 
approval. We call this case-by-case approach interaction-based coordination. This was 
evident in a number of interactions, such as the request of the German subsidiary to 
retain staff allocated to standardized work (June 2008). Managers tended to offer 
services from India as a standard solution to new customers while locally performing 
services for existing customers. 
Accountability avoidance. An important reason for subsidiary managers to follow 
interaction-based coordination was to meet customer expectations, follow HQ directives 
and fulfill expectations of other subsidiary managers at GSS. To enable flexibility, 
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subsidiary managers tried to avoid being held accountable for adhering to charter-based 
changes. After all, subsidiary managers were still bound by the target agreement signed 
in Phase 1. The implementation of Ti2L illustrates the avoidance of accountability. 
In Phase 1, dates were scheduled to switch a customer in North America to the 
standard ticket software: ‘I have committed January end as possible date for switching 
to [Ti2L]. I need your support to ensure that this is somehow met’ (USA to CEO, 
January 2008). However, in Phase 2, the customer still had not been transitioned to the 
new software and dates were postponed to April. Eventually, in Phase 3, the following 
conclusion was reached for the same customer: ‘We are discussing it with respective 
internal and external agencies…and discussions and commitments (and non-
commitments) are going to take some time…Committing something before that can 
create problems for us’ (USA to CEO, September 2008). Subsidiary managers 
continued to signal that all customers would soon be switched to Ti2L, but delayed 
concrete plans multiple times. Over time, they increasingly avoided being held 
accountable for adhering to fixed transition dates. 
Capability-level changes in Phase 3. Despite GSS’s efforts to develop capabilities 
commensurate with the new charters, existing capabilities prevailed (see Table 1). For 
instance, CUs in Finland and Germany retained the capacity to fulfill ticket work. 
Although the charter outlined that all standardized work had to be transferred to SDUs, 
this was largely not practiced: ‘for client F less than 40% of standard services are 
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sourced from India or Russia, 60% are performed in Germany. Currently we only use 
Russia, as our customer is skeptical about sourcing from India. We do not find that 
sourcing more services from abroad would work’ (Germany to CEO, June 2008). 
Consequently, CUs shifted less work to India and Russia. This jeopardized the 
feasibility of the SDU business plans, as employees were hired and trained but 
workload did not increase as expected. Because little work was transferred to India, 
employees with the desired skills were lost.  
Conceptual Interpretation: coordination and the alignment of charters 
and capabilities 
In the sections that follow, we first discuss the role of shifts in coordination mechanisms 
for the alignment of charters and capabilities and theorize the reasons why alignment 
efforts failed. We then identify three key managerial challenges in the alignment 
process (see Table 2). 
------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
------------------------------------------------ 
The role of shifts in coordination mechanisms for charter-capability alignment 
Our analysis suggests that alignment and potential misalignment between subsidiary 
charters and capabilities unfolds through shifts in how managers coordinate (charter-
based coordination, experience-based coordination and interaction-based coordination). 
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Indeed, we see substantial differences in how these coordination mechanisms establish 
shared understanding, accountability and predictability with important implications for 
the alignment of charters and capabilities (see Table 2).  
Charter-based coordination is based on the codification of subsidiary roles in order 
to create a mutual expectation structure among HQ and subsidiary managers. Charter-
based coordination aims at clearly specifying roles as well as the underlying capabilities 
in terms of skills, but also technological and managerial systems. Charter-based 
coordination has two important implications: it guides resource allocation towards 
developing co-specialized subsidiary capabilities and formalizes subsidiary managers’ 
accountability. Our analysis also suggests that coordination mechanisms are influenced 
by managerial focus: actors’ key areas of attention, at any given point in time. The 
initial managerial focus in Phase 1 was on organizing. In this phase, managers designed 
the new organization and made strategic decisions based on how the organization 
should ideally operate in the future. 
Experience-based coordination, on the other hand, draws on subsidiary managers’ 
experiences with the new strategy and the extent to which complementary capabilities 
are available in other subsidiaries as a coordinating mechanism. This coordination 
mechanism is focused on the actual operating of new subsidiary charters. While this 
coordination mechanism maintains shared understanding of subsidiary roles it also 
results in the erosion of accountability. In the GSS case, this shift in coordination 
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mechanism was triggered by the mismatch between subsidiary managers’ expectations 
and reality. Subsidiary managers’ willingness to invest in capabilities commensurate 
with new charters was influenced by the extent to which expectations about the resource 
commitments of other subsidiaries and expectations of service quality were met. 
Interaction-based coordination refers to bi-lateral, ad-hoc and case-by-case 
coordination geared towards meeting complex and divergent expectations of multiple 
stakeholders. Our analysis suggests that such a coordination mechanism might be based 
on a management focus of maintaining legitimacy in the light of complex management 
challenges (such as implementing co-specialized charters in a global organization). 
Interaction-based coordination maintains shared understanding of subsidiary roles but 
also allows the avoidance of accountability, and, due to the ad-hoc nature of 
coordination, the continuation of expectation clashes. Thus, interaction-based 
coordination may result in the further reduction of investments in new subsidiary-level 
capabilities. 
Coordination and the failure of charter and capability alignment 
The findings of this paper raise an important question: Can the misalignment of charters 
and capabilities endure in perpetuity, or do subsidiaries eventually drift into alignment 
by either renegotiating charters or changing their capabilities? The shift in coordination 
mechanisms identified in this paper allows us to address this question.  
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Coordination mechanisms affect alignment via capability level change: Our 
findings imply that alignment through changes to subsidiary capabilities is unlikely 
unless HQ and subsidiary managers shift from a mode of accountability erosion to one 
of renewed accountability, focused on allocating resources commensurate with 
subsidiary charters. Thus, the de facto void of accountability increases the impact of 
path dependency at the subsidiary level and maintains the existing portfolio of 
capabilities. 
Alignment via the renegotiation of subsidiary charters requires change in 
coordination mechanism: Alignment via the renegotiation of subsidiary charters 
requires managers’ to abandon interaction-based coordination and reinstate charter-
based coordination. The conditions under which this might occur are likely to be 
contingent on the relationship between subsidiaries in the value chain of the firm (for 
instance the extent of co-specialization or dependence between subsidiaries) as well as 
the relationship between subsidiaries and HQ. For example, ITCORP benefited from 
signaling GSS’s new strategy of IT service delivery to the market. Within GSS, HQ 
accepted CU-level profits at the expense of SDU-level losses. Thus, the risk of co-
specialized charters was mainly borne by SDUs. Since SDUs were only able to operate 
profitably if CUs allocated work, neither CUs nor SDUs had a strong incentive to 
renegotiate charters. 
Forthcoming in Organization Studies 
34 
 
Implications for change in coordination mechanism: The eventual move towards 
alignment would require the top-down reinstatement of charter-based coordination. This 
also would have required subsidiary and HQ managers to more explicitly negotiate 
which roles particular subsidiaries should assume and how subsidiaries could develop 
respective capabilities. Yet, these negotiations did not happen, neither at the start of the 
change initiative, nor later. Rather, negotiation happened on the level of specific 
customer-related issues symptomatic of the subsidiary managers’ struggles to 
implement the new strategy. Yet, the notion of prevalence must not be interpreted as a 
situation of lock-in, which cannot be changed. Subsidiary charters and capabilities are 
constantly in flux and react to changing market conditions.  
Challenges in the alignment of charters and capabilities 
The process understanding presented above also sheds light on three overarching 
challenges involved in top-down charter changes (Table 2), which we describe in detail 
below.  
Desired vs. realistic expectations. Initially, managers expected new charters to 
quickly reflect organizational reality. This shared understanding shaped managers’ 
expectations about subsidiaries’ capabilities. When subsidiaries sent work to India and 
Russia, however, capabilities were not yet fully developed and their expectations were 
thus unmet. As a consequence, managers reset their expectations and adopted a 
managerial focus based on their experiences of what had worked previously. Challenge 
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1 therefore refers to the managerial tension between fulfilling desired expectations by 
signaling that complementary capabilities have been implemented and forming realistic 
expectations about which capabilities are aligned with new charters and which ones are 
not yet functional.  
Accountability enforcement vs. exemption. The charter, and the target setting 
procedure that followed its introduction, created a structure under which managers were 
held accountable to invest in the development of new capabilities. However, subsidiary 
managers struggled with the tension between requirements for flexibility on the one 
hand, and accountability for charter compliance on the other. At the same time, 
managers were frequently granted exemptions from the charter to meet the expectations 
of local customers. These exemptions eroded accountability in some subsidiaries, which 
had a domino effect on all other subsidiaries due to the co-specialization of roles. When 
subsidiaries in high-cost countries shifted less work abroad, subsidiaries in India and 
Russia received less work than expected. Ultimately, the shift to interaction-based, ad-
hoc coordination enabled subsidiary managers to increasingly negotiate exceptions to 
charters and thus avoid being held accountable for failing to develop local capabilities 
commensurate with them. Challenge 2 therefore refers to managers’ struggle between 
enforcing accountability for implementing capabilities and obtaining exemptions from 
this accountability in order to preserve customer relationships.  
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Shared vs. accurate understanding. A third challenge for managing alignment refers 
to the ability of managers to challenge and revise their shared understanding of 
subsidiary charters. This might be particularly challenging if the managerial focus were 
no longer on implementing strategy, but on creating internal or external legitimacy. Yet 
GSS subsidiaries did not try to renegotiate their roles. If India had decided to 
renegotiate its role, CUs would have lost further confidence and would have 
immediately stopped routing standardized work to India. Renegotiating single 
subsidiary roles would have been challenging due to the co-specialization of charters. 
Moreover, HQ’s task was to implement a strategy that closed the gap with major 
competitors, which supposedly operated according to a global operating model. The 
rationale for building co-specialized capabilities changed from being a cost-saving 
measure to a source of legitimacy for GSS subsidiaries. Consequently, despite 
deviations from charters, subsidiaries continued to promote their shared understanding 
of subsidiary roles. However, whereas subsidiary managers shared an understanding of 
the future organization, their views of reality were not shared. Challenge 3 therefore 
refers to managers’ struggle between creating unity by sharing an understanding of an 
ideal strategy, and accepting an accurate understanding of reality that challenges this 
shared understanding.  
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Discussion and theoretical implications 
Applying a coordination perspective to the alignment of charters and capabilities and 
related managerial struggles yields new insights into the dynamics through which multi-
national firms evolve (Birkinshaw, 1996a; Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Galunic & 
Eisenhardt, 1996). Yet, until now, theorizing on the alignment of charters and 
capabilities has remained elusive. By analyzing the implications of shifts in 
coordination mechanisms over time, this paper contributes towards a theory of charter 
and capability alignment in the MNE literature. 
First, extant research points out two main mechanisms of alignment: a) the shared 
understanding of subsidiary roles between HQ and subsidiaries is sufficient to 
coordinate resource allocation decisions towards alignment (Birkinshaw & Hood, 
1998); b) subsidiary managers will eventually try to renegotiate charters if they consider 
their subsidiary to have additional capabilities (Balogun et al., 2011; Birkinshaw & 
Hood, 1998; Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2006). By taking a coordination 
perspective we show that both mechanisms of charter-capability alignment are more 
complex than previously assumed. Below we discuss implications for both mechanisms 
of alignment. 
Our findings confirm Birkinshaw and Hood’s (1998) assumption that charter-based 
coordination facilitates the alignment of charters and capabilities. However, more 
subtly, we show that the shared understanding of subsidiary roles is only a necessary 
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condition for alignment via subsidiary level capability development and that, in 
addition, HQ and subsidiary managers need to establish mutual expectations of resource 
investments as well as accountability for those investments. In GSS, this was evident in 
the shift to experience and interaction based coordination. As coordination mechanisms 
changed, so did the ways in which expectations and the accountability for resource 
allocation decisions were established. Thus, while interaction based coordination 
maintained a shared understanding of subsidiary roles amongst managers the erosion of 
accountability and expectation clashes that went with it resulted in the misalignment of 
charters and capabilities. 
Moreover, focusing on managerial coordination also provides a more nuanced 
picture of alignment via charter renegotiation. Prior research shows that reduced 
autonomy (Balogun et al., 2011) or local resource conditions (Dörrenbächer and 
Gammelgaard, 2006) might trigger the renegotiation of charters through micro-political 
actions (Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2006). Our findings suggest that shifts in 
coordination mechanisms towards interaction-based coordination allow subsidiaries to 
retain autonomy and tap into local resource advantages while leaving formal subsidiary 
roles unchallenged. This means that micro-political behavior is not targeted towards 
changing the charter (as suggested by prior research) but towards creating a mechanism 
of coordination which allows the avoidance accountability. Moreover, such maneuvers 
might be particularly prevalent in cases of co-specialization and high interdependence 
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of subsidiaries (such as in cases of IT-Offshoring like GSS), where unilateral charter 
negotiations have severe consequences for the entire network of subsidiaries (Kumar et 
al., 2009; Rugman et al., 2011).  
Second, and related to that, we show how shifts in coordination underpin the 
phenomenon of decoupling in MNEs, a situation of misalignment between charters and 
capabilities. Decoupling refers to symbolic forms of action through which organizations 
(e.g., subsidiaries) signal compliance with formal structures while actually engaging in 
divergent practices (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Prior studies show that decoupling might 
be a deliberate strategy aimed at maintaining operational degrees of freedom when 
managers are faced, for instance, with regulatory change (Bromley & Powell, 2012; 
Scott, 2008). Recently, the notion of decoupling has experienced a renaissance 
(Bromley & Powell, 2012). Examples include Sandholtz’s (2012) study on the adoption 
of ISO 9000 as well as Lozeau and colleagues’ (2002) paper on management techniques 
such as TQM. Research on organizational change also often uses the term ‘window 
dressing’ to describe how managers merely pretend to commit to a new strategy thereby 
disguising a lack of change in the organization (Bartunek et al., 2006). Despite 
increased interest in this phenomenon, the process through which decoupling emerges 
has remained under-theorized (Sandholtz, 2012). The shift from charter-based 
coordination to interaction-based coordination helps to explain the phenomenon of 
decoupling from the perspective of managerial workin our case, the coordinating 
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work of subsidiary managers. In particular, we show how decoupling emerges as the 
articulated charted loses its role as a coordinating mechanism while subsidiary 
managers maintain a shared understanding of subsidiary roles. Insights into the 
activities through which decoupling emerges have been identified as the ‘missing level 
of analysis’ in research on decoupling (Sandholtz, 2012). 
Third, our insights also contribute to establishing micro-foundations of capability 
development on subsidiary level. Micro-foundations research has been concerned with 
explaining capability level changes by investigating the behavioral antecedents of 
managerial decisions, such as actions, interactions, motivation and incentives (Felin et 
al., 2012; Foss, 2011). Yet, more specifically, micro-foundations scholars have also 
problematized the role of coordination for the development and change of 
organizational capabilities, particularly in situations of high uncertainty such as strategic 
change (Foss, 2011; Grant, 1996). Indeed, Foss (2011) already assumes that in such 
situations coordination may become more ad hoc. This paper answers to this call but 
also provides a more nuanced picture of how and why such interaction-based 
coordination emerges and why such coordination might undermine capability 
development. We argue that managers’ attempts to deal with coordination challenges 
(such as desired vs. realistic expectations, accountability exemption vs. enforcement as 
well as shared vs. accurate understanding) trigger shifts in coordination mechanisms. 
Charter-based coordination shaped managers’ expectations about services from other 
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subsidiaries. However, since capabilities were not fully developed, managers found that 
other subsidiaries did not meet those idealized expectations and lost faith in the new 
complementary charters. Second, GSS intended to hold managers accountable for the 
development of capabilities in their subsidiaries. However, faced with underdeveloped 
capabilities in other subsidiaries, managers requested exceptions from their charters, 
which were frequently granted by HQ. Finally, managers did not update their shared 
understanding of subsidiary charters based on operational reality. This continuity had a 
flipside: managers’ shared understanding of subsidiary charters contrasted with reality. 
As capabilities failed to develop, shared understanding was not updated and financial 
plans consequently reflected idealized envisioned, rather than real scenarios. 
Finally, by investigating the alignment of charters and capabilities we also provide 
insights into the micro-dynamics underpinning capability-level path dependency on 
subsidiary level (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Schreyögg & Sydow, 2011; Sydow et al., 2009; 
Vergne & Durand, 2010). Indeed, Phelps and Fuller (2016) have called for further 
research on the antecedents of inertia on subsidiary level. Companies remain path-
dependent through two processes. On the one hand, everyday decisions reinforce 
existing capabilities through positive feedback loops. On the other hand, alternative 
solutions are found lacking or are rejected in particular decision situations (so-called 
contingent events) (Vergne & Durand, 2010). By investigating changes to subsidiary 
capabilities from the perspective of managerial coordination we show how path 
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dependency may prevail despite deliberate, top-down attempts to change strategy and 
depart from path-dependent behavior. Managers’ shared understanding of the future 
organization anticipated a departure from path-dependent behavior, yet it also created 
vulnerability (Schreyögg & Sydow, 2011; Sydow et al., 2009). When managers’ 
expectations are not met, they tend to revert to prior ways of working, thereby 
reinforcing existing capabilities (Vergne & Durand, 2010).  
Boundary conditions and future research 
The setting of this study creates a number of boundary conditions for the theoretical 
arguments made in this paper and how our findings may inform future research. 
The arguments put forward in this paper refer to a particular form of charter: highly 
articulated, codified subsidiary role descriptions. We suggest that future research could 
take a broader perspective and study how managerial coordination influences the 
alignment of charters and capabilities in settings in which charters are not codified. 
Such research could, for instance, investigate how accountability for subsidiary level 
investments following charter change is established and maintained in the absence of 
articulated charters. 
A second boundary condition refers to the type of charter change investigated. Or 
findings are derived from a setting in which changes are driven by a top-down initiated 
change in subsidiary charters. Prior research indicates that charters may however also 
evolve through subsidiaries’ autonomous actions (e.g. Balogun et al., 2011; Birkinshaw 
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& Hood, 1998). We therefore encourage future research to focus on the patterns of 
coordination in other settings of capability and charter alignment, when for instance 
competition for charters exists or when charters are re-negotiated in a bottom-up 
process. 
Finally, a third boundary condition is the co-specialized relationship between the 
value creating activities of subsidiaries at GSS, which are common in the IT industry 
(Kumar et al., 2009), but potentially less common in other industries. Co-specialization 
might be a reason for subsidiary managers’ reluctance to unilaterally renegotiate 
charters. Hence, in cases where there is less co-dependence amongst subsidiaries the 
described dynamics might unfold differently. We therefore encourage future research to 
investigate coordination following charter change across a variety of organizational 
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Figure 1. Services ordered and delivered between January 2007 and December 2008, by 
geographic location. 
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required by new charters 
Actual changes to subsidiary-level capabilities over time 
Phase 1 
(Apr 2007–Dec 2007) 
Phase 2 
(Jan 2008–Apr 2008) 
Phase 3 
(May 2008–Sep 2008) 
Skills 
 CUs required to increase 
number of IT consultants 
 SDUs required to reduce 
number of consultants and 
increase number of IT 
engineers to perform 
standardized IT services 
Cross-subsidiary agreement to build and 
use complementary skills  
Examples: 
 UK & GER: Convert ticket workers to 
consultants 
 IN & RU: Increase number of ticket 
workers from 465 to 923  
Subsidiaries do not invest in developing 
employees’ skills 
Examples: 
 GER: Fear of job loss when giving work 
to RU or IN 
 IN: Ticket workers lack knowhow 
 
Old skills are retained; new skills 
are lost  
Examples: 
 FIN: Ticket work is retained 
 IN: High rates of attrition of 
critical employees 
 GER: Retains unit for 
standardized service delivery 
Management 
systems 
 The complementarity of 
charters requires the 
establishment of a service 
catalogue and clearly 
defined transfer prices per 
service item 
Incentives and standards for cross-
subsidiary exchanges 
Examples: 
 Targets for CUs focus on increasing 
sales and giving work to IN & RU 
 Targets in IN & RU focus on 
standardization and efficiency 
Avoidance of fixed targets; HQ grants 
exceptions that undermine standardization 
Examples: 
 Transfer prices above competition 
 Low number of projects means no 
efficiency improvements in SDUs 
 Changes in transfer price lead to 
profitability problems for IN & RU 
Standard terms unchanged despite 
frequent exceptions 
Examples: 
 Profit and customer retention 
prioritized over offshore targets 
 Targets for standardization and 
efficiency gains not achieved 
Technological 
systems 
 The delivery of services 
across CUs and SDUs 
requires the harmonization 
of IT platforms to manage 
customer requests (Ti2L) 
HQ and subsidiary managers decide to 
introduce Ti2L as new standard across all 
subsidiaries 
Examples: 
 Management meeting: Subsidiary 
managers commit to implementation 
 IN: Agrees to monitor implementation 
Commitment to standard ticket tool 
contrasts with lack of its adoption across 
subsidiaries 
Examples: 
 IN: Pushes subsidiaries to use standard 
software 
FIN: Global software differs from local 
standard 
 UK: No transition to new software due to 
licensing costs 
Implementation of standard 
software stalls and eventually 
comes to a halt 
Examples: 
 US: Software use threatens 
customer relationship 
 FIN: Local solution is retained 
Values & 
beliefs 
 New subsidiary charters 
require subsidiary managers 
to perceive IT service 
delivery as a global rather 
than a localized business 
Shift from local to global mindset 
Examples: 
 Global work exchanges intended to 
increase staff work satisfaction 
 Subsidiary managers visualize their 
roles and symbolically sign pictures as 
they commit to new charters 
 Target agreements with global targets 
Increasing friction between global mindset 
and local values 
Examples: 
 GER: Few employees are considered fit 
for new tasks 
 IN: Staff fears unit closure 
Subsidiary managers actions guided 
by local pressures 
 
Examples: 
 FIN: Keeping work local 
becomes more important 
 IN & RU: Only simple tasks are 
offshored; employees quit 
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Table 2. The role of coordination in the alignment of charters and subsidiary capabilities 
 Coordination between HQ and subsidiary managers 
Overarching 
challenges 
 Phase 1 
(Apr 2007–Dec 2007) 
Phase 2 
(Jan 2008–Apr 2008) 
Phase 3 
(May 2008–Sep 2008) 
Coordination 
mechanism 
Charter-based coordination  
Coordination based on codification of 
subsidiary roles in TOM 
Experience-based coordination 
Subsidiary managers draw on prior 
experience with new strategy to coordinate 
Interaction-based coordination 
Coordination is based on ad-hoc interactions 




 All services and their costs are specified 
in a standardized service catalogue 
(transfer price) 
 Subsidiaries in high-cost countries 
mandated to outsource standardized 
services to India, Russia or Argentina  
Expectation reset 
 CUs complain about competitive 
disadvantage based on new transfer price 
 New charter changes create difficulties to 
retain talent in India which puts quality 
and speed of delivery under pressure 
 Introduction of ticket software delayed 
Expectation clash 
 Revenue targets conflict with targets to 
increase global sourcing. Dependence on 
existing client-base delays ramp-up of 
offshoring 
 CEO is determined to match competitor 
prices in Finland at any cost. Unfreezing 
of transfer prices creates planning and 
profitability issues in SDUs 




 Offshore service delivery part of target 
operating model 
 HQ sets target for the use of standard 
service catalogue 
 Based on TOM, the use of the standard 
software Ti2L is mandatory in order to 
facilitate offshoring 
Accountability erosion 
 Increased pressure on HQ to legitimize 
“one-off” deviation from fixed transfer 
price regime 
 Introduction of lower transfer price for a 
set of existing customers 
 Deviation from standard ticket tool 
"accepted" if interface is used and paid for 
by the subsidiary 
Accountability avoidance 
 Subsidiary managers contact CEO to 
renegotiate standard transfer price 
 Subsidiaries further delay introduction of 





Creation of shared understanding 
 ITCORP confirms that GSS is 
changing its strategy by shifting work 
to standardized delivery units 
 HQ communicates roadmap outlining 
when each customer will be switched 
to standard software 
Maintenance of shared understanding 
 Despite delay in introduction of Ti2L, 
subsidiaries maintain commitment to 
switching to Ti2L 
 Subsidiaries agree to fix transfer prices 
Maintenance of shared understanding 
 HQ and subsidiaries maintain commitment 
to TOM and new subsidiary charters 
 






 Allocation of resources at the 
subsidiary level towards fulfilling new 
charters  
 Creation of global mindset 
Alignment/misalignment 
 Introduction of Ti2L stalls 
 Challenges related to staff retention in 
India 
Misalignment 
 CUs retain capabilities for standardized 
work (e.g., Germany) 
 Ti2L not implemented as new standard 
 Skill and staff retention issues in SDUs 
 
 
